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ABSTRACT
Privacy-preserving record linkage (PPRL) aims at integrat-
ing sensitive information from multiple disparate databases
of different organizations. PPRL approaches are increas-
ingly required in real-world application areas such as health-
care, national security, and business. Previous approaches
have mostly focused on linking only two databases as well as
the use of a dedicated linkage unit. Scaling PPRL to more
databases (multi-party PPRL) is an open challenge since
privacy threats as well as the computation and communica-
tion costs for record linkage increase significantly with the
number of databases. We thus propose the use of a new en-
coding method of sensitive data based on Counting Bloom
Filters (CBF) to improve privacy for multi-party PPRL. We
also investigate optimizations to reduce communication and
computation costs for CBF-based multi-party PPRL with
and without the use of a dedicated linkage unit. Empirical
evaluations conducted with real datasets show the viability
of the proposed approaches and demonstrate their scalabil-
ity, linkage quality, and privacy protection.
Keywords
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1. INTRODUCTION
A wide range of real-world applications, including in health-
care, government services, crime and fraud detection, na-
tional security, and businesses, require person-related data
from multiple sources held by different organizations to be
integrated or linked. Integrated data can then be used for
data mining and analytics to empower efficient and qual-
ity decision making with rich data. Integrating data helps
improving the quality of data by identifying and resolving
conflicts in data values, enriching data with additional de-
tailed information, and dealing with missing values [2].
The analysis and mining of data integrated across organi-
zations can be used, for example, in health outbreak systems
This is an extended version of an article published in IEEE International
Conference on Data Mining (ICDM) International Workshop on Privacy
and Discrimination in Data Mining (PDDM) 2016 [42].
.
that allow the early detection of infectious diseases before
they spread widely around a country or even worldwide.
Such an application requires data to be integrated across
several sources, including human health data, travel data,
consumed drug data, and even animal health data [6]. A
second contemporary motivating example is national secu-
rity applications that integrate data from law enforcement
agencies, Internet service providers, businesses, as well as
financial institutions to enable the accurate identification of
crime and fraud, or of terrorism suspects [25].
In the absence of unique entity identifiers in the databases
that are to be linked, personal identifying attributes (such
as names and addresses) need to be used for the linkage.
Known as quasi-identifiers (QIDs) [41], such attribute val-
ues are in general assumed to be sufficiently well correlated
with entities to allow accurate linkage. Using such personal
information across different organizations, however, often
leads to privacy and confidentiality concerns. This problem
has been addressed through the development of ‘privacy-
preserving record linkage’ (PPRL) [43] techniques. PPRL
aims to conduct linkage using only masked (encoded) QIDs
without requiring any sensitive or confidential information
to be exchanged and revealed between the organizations in-
volved in the linkage. Generally, masking is conducted on
QIDs to transform the original values such that a specific
functional relationship exists between the original and the
masked values [41]. While there have been many different
approaches proposed for PPRL (as reviewed in [43]), most
work thus far has concentrated on linking records from only
two sources (or parties). As the healthcare and national
security examples described above show, linking data from
several sources is however commonly required in practical
applications.
The drawback of the small number of existing PPRL solu-
tions that can link data from multiple parties is that either
(1) they only support exact matching (which classifies sets
of records as matches if their masked QIDs are exactly the
same and as non-matches otherwise) [14, 17] or (2) they are
applicable to QIDs of categorical data only [12, 22]. How-
ever, in many PPRL applications QIDs of string data, such
as names and addresses, are required. These QIDs often
contain errors and variations which necessitates the use of
approximate comparison functions (that are computation-
ally expensive in terms of the number of comparisons) for
comparing QIDs. In this paper, we tackle the multi-party
PPRL problem by developing an efficient privacy-preserving
approach for approximate matching of (masked) QIDs of
string data from multiple records.
p2 p3 p4p1
Comparison
p2 p3 p4p1
Comparison
D1 D2 D3 D4 D1 D2 D3 D4
4b (n / b )4
b (n / b) b (n / b) b (n / b)b (n / b)
Linkage Unit (LU)
Ca
nd
ida
te
re
co
rd
 se
ts
Candidate
record sets
Linkage Unit (LU)
b (n / b) 2 3 4
4
4b (n / b )
b (n / b )4
b (n / b )3b (n / b )2
Figure 1: An overview of traditional na¨ıve comparison of candidate record sets masked using BFs (left) and CBFs
(right, as will be described in detail in Section 3) from p = 4 parties using a LU . Databases are indexed/blocked to
reduce the number of candidate record sets such that only records in the same blocks are compared and classified.
Blocks are illustrated by different patterns in Di, with 1 ≤ i ≤ p. n denotes the number of records in the databases
(assuming all databases are of equal size) and b denotes the number of blocks generated (assuming blocks of equal
size). Independent of the masking function and the communication pattern used (i.e. BFs and direct one-to-one
communication in the left figure, and CBFs and ring-based communication in the right figure), the na¨ıve approach
results in exponential complexity of b (n4/b4) candidate sets each consisting of p = 4 records (one from each party).
We propose the use of Counting Bloom Filter (CBF) en-
coding, which is a variation of Bloom filter (BF) encod-
ing [43], to enable efficient and approximate privacy-preserving
linkage of multiple databases. BFs are bit vectors into which
values are hash-mapped using hash functions (as we describe
in Section 2.1). CBFs, on the other hand, are integer vec-
tors that contain count values in each position. Multiple BFs
can be summarized as a single CBF using the vector addi-
tion operation between BFs. Previous BF encoding-based
PPRL approaches [8, 33] suggest using a linkage unit (LU),
which is a dedicated external party that can perform link-
age by comparing candidate record sets (masked into BFs)
from all database owners and calculating their similarities
to classify them as matches or non-matches. Our hypoth-
esis is that, rather than sending BFs from all parties to a
linkage unit (LU) to calculate their similarity, a single CBF
for each candidate record set generated over p parties can be
used to calculate their similarity, as illustrated in Figure 1
(left for BFs and right for CBFs). Since CBFs contain only
the summary information (count values) of multiple records
in their positions rather than the actual individual bit values
of a single record as in BFs, they provide increased privacy
compared to BFs, as we discuss in Section 6. To the best of
our knowledge, this privacy aspect of CBFs has so far not
been utilized in PPRL.
An additional challenge with multi-party PPRL is that
complexity increases significantly with multiple parties in
terms of both computational efforts and communication vol-
ume. A basic approach would be to send all masked records
from all p parties to a LU that can calculate pair-wise simi-
larities between masked records, which is of O(p2 · n2) com-
plexity, where n is the size of databases assuming all databases
are of equal size. However, identifying a matching set of
records from all p parties is not possible with such a ba-
sic pair-wise comparison approach. On the other hand, the
number of na¨ıve (all-to-all) comparisons between records re-
quired across all p databases (D1, D2, · · · , Dp) is equal to
the product of the size of the databases (i.e. n× n× · · ·n =
np). Addressing this complexity challenge, two-step algo-
rithms have been developed where in the first step a private
indexing/blocking technique is used to reduce the number of
candidate record sets from np to b ·np/bp, assuming b blocks
of equal size. In the second step only these candidate record
pairs have to be compared and classified [43]. Compared to
the quadratic number of record pairs when linking only two
databases (O(n2)), in multi-party PPRL the number of can-
didate record sets increases exponentially with the number
of parties (O(np)), and thus using existing private blocking
techniques would not sufficiently reduce the number of com-
parisons, as has been empirically studied in several recent
approaches [26, 27, 39].
Figure 1 overviews the na¨ıve computation and commu-
nication of (masked) candidate record sets from multiple
parties (p = 4) using a LU . Independent of the used mask-
ing function (BFs in the left figure and CBFs in the right
figure) and the communication pattern (direct one-to-one
communication between each party and the LU in the left
figure and ring-based communication among the parties in
the right figure, as will be described in Section 2), the na¨ıve
approach results in exponential complexity. Efficient com-
munication patterns and advanced filtering approaches for
multi-party PPRL therefore need to be developed in order to
reduce the potentially huge number of comparisons. More-
over, with multiple parties the privacy risk of collusion in-
creases, where a sub-set of parties collude among them in
order to learn about another party’s (or sub-set of parties’)
private data. Both examples for the na¨ıve method described
in Figure 1 are highly susceptible to collusion.
In order to overcome these scalability and privacy chal-
lenges of multi-party PPRL, we introduce two efficient CBF-
based communication patterns that either use a LU or op-
erate symmetrically without a LU (where a trusted external
party is not available to act as a LU). The proposed ap-
proaches can significantly reduce the number of comparisons
required between records in contrast to the na¨ıve all-to-all
comparisons, and thereby improve the scalability while also
improving the privacy (reducing the likelihood of collusions)
by arranging parties into several groups and by distributing
computations among parties.
Contributions: Our contributions in this paper are: (1)
a novel multi-party PPRL protocol based on CBFs and se-
cure summation for efficient, approximate, and private link-
age; (2) two variations of extended secure summation proto-
cols for improved privacy against collusion among the data
base owners: (a) homomorphic encryption-based and (b)
salting-based (using random seed integers); (3) two efficient
communication patterns (with and without a LU) for re-
ducing the comparison space and risk of collusion between
parties and thereby improving scalability and privacy, re-
spectively, in multi-party PPRL; (4) an analysis of the pro-
tocol in terms of the three properties of PPRL: scalability
(complexity), linkage quality, and privacy; and (5) an em-
pirical evaluation and comparison of our protocol with two
baseline approaches using large North Carolina Voter Reg-
istration (NCVR) [4] datasets.
Outline: In the following section we describe the prelim-
inaries. In Section 3 we propose our protocol for multi-party
PPRL based on CBFs and secure summation, where in Sec-
tion 4 we we propose two extended secure summation proto-
cols to improve privacy of our approach, and in Section 5 we
introduce two efficient communication patterns to improve
scalability and privacy. We analyze our protocol in terms
of complexity, linkage quality, and privacy in Section 6, and
in Section 7 we conduct an empirical study on the NCVR
datasets to validate these analyses. We provide a review of
related work in Section 8. Finally, we summarize and discuss
future research directions in Section 9.
2. PRELIMINARY CONCEPTS AND BUILD-
ING BLOCKS
In this section, we define the problem of multi-party PPRL
and explain how CBFs can be used for efficiently calculating
similarities (approximate matching) of QID values between
a set of multiple (two or more) records (held by different
parties) in PPRL.
We assume p database owners P1, P2, · · · , Pp with their re-
spective databases D1, D2, · · · , Dp (containing sensitive or
confidential identifying information) participate in the pro-
cess under the honest-but-curious (HBC) [43]. In the HBC
model, parties are assumed to follow the protocol without
deviating or sending false information while being curious to
learn about other parties’ data. However, the HBC model
does not assume that the parties do not collude among them
to learn about other parties’ data [19]. We quantify the risk
of collusion in multi-party PPRL and the reduction of risk by
our communication patterns in Section 6.2. We also assume
a set of QID attributes A, which will be used for the linkage,
is common to all these databases. We formally define the
problem of PPRL of multiple databases as follows.
Definition 2.1. Multi-party PPRL: Assume P1, . . . , Pp
are the p owners (parties) of the databases D1, . . . ,Dp, re-
spectively. They wish to determine which of their records
R1,i ∈ D1, R2,j ∈ D2, . . ., Rp,k ∈ Dp match based on the
(masked) QIDs of these records according to a decision model
C(R1,i,R2,j , . . ., Rp,k) that classifies record sets (R1,i,R2,j,
. . ., Rp,k) into one of the two classes M of matches and U of
non-matches. Assuming the HBC adversary model, parties
P1, . . . , Pp are honest, in that they follow the linkage protocol
steps, while they do not wish to reveal their actual records
R1,i, . . . , Rp,k with any other party. They however are pre-
pared to disclose to each other, or to an external party, the
actual values of some selected attributes of the record sets
that are in class M to allow analysis.
Masking functions used for privacy-preserving algorithms
can be categorized into two: cryptographic-based secure
multi-party computation (SMC) techniques and perturbation-
based techniques [41]. The former approach is generally
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Figure 2: Similarity calculation of QIDs of two records
masked using (a) BFs and (b) CBFs, where l = 14, k = 2,
and q = 2.
more expensive with regard to the computation and com-
munication complexities though it provides strong privacy
guarantees and high accuracy [18]. The latter uses efficient
techniques and, as opposed to SMC techniques, these tech-
niques aim to hide (mask) information about the original
values (to preserve privacy) while still allowing to perform
approximate matching between the masked values using the
functional relationship between original and masked data.
We propose an efficient protocol for multi-party PPRL us-
ing perturbation-based masking. In this section, we describe
the four building blocks of our protocol, and in Section 3 we
present our algorithm in detail. In the following two sections
we assume a linkage unit (LU) is available to conduct the
linkage, and in Section 5 we propose a variation where a LU
is not required to conduct the linkage using our protocol.
2.1 Bloom filter encoding
Bloom filter (BF) encoding has been used as an efficient
masking (encoding) technique in several PPRL solutions [9,
17, 26, 34, 35, 38, 39, 40]. A BF bi is a bit array data
structure of length l bits where all bits are initially set to
0. k independent hash functions, h1, h2, . . . , hk, each with
range 1, . . . l, are used to map each of the elements s in a
set S into the BF by setting the bit positions hj(s) with
1 ≤ j ≤ k to 1.
Schnell et al. [34] were the first to propose a method for
approximate matching in PPRL of two databases using BFs.
In their work, as in our protocol, the character q-grams (sub-
strings of length q) of QID values in A of each record in the
databases to be linked are hash-mapped into a BF using k
independent hash functions. This method of BF encoding
is known as Cryptographic Long term Key (CLK) encod-
ing [34].
These BFs are then either sent to a LU that calculates the
similarity of pairs of BFs, as suggested by Schnell et al. [34]
and Durham et al. [9], or they are partially exchanged among
the database owners to distributively calculate the similari-
ties of BF pairs/sets, as proposed by Lai et al. [17] and Vat-
salan and Christen for two-party [38] and multi-party [39,
40] approaches. Figure 2(a) illustrates the encoding of bi-
grams (q = 2) of two QID values ‘peter’ and ‘pete’ into
l = 14 bits long BFs using k = 2 hash functions.
2.2 Dice coefficient
Any set-based similarity function (such as overlap, Jac-
card, and Dice coefficient) can be used to calculate the simi-
larity of pairs or sets of (multiple) BFs. The Dice coefficient
has been used for matching of BFs since it is insensitive to
many matching zeros (bit positions to which no q-grams are
hash-mapped) in long BFs [34]. In future, we aim to inves-
tigate how other approximate string comparison functions,
such as edit distance [30] and Jaro and Winkler [10, 45], can
be extended to calculate the similarity of more than two
values.
Definition 2.2. We define the Dice coefficient similarity
of p BFs (b1, · · · , bp) as:
Dice sim(b1, · · · , bp) =
p× z
∑p
i=1 xi
(1)
where z is the number of common bit positions that are set
to 1 in all p BFs (common 1-bits), and xi is the number of
bit positions set to 1 in bi (1-bits), 1 ≤ i ≤ p.
Figure 2(a) illustrates the Dice coefficient similarity calcu-
lation of the two QID values ‘peter’ and ‘pete’ masked into
BFs.
2.3 Secure summation
A secure summation protocol [7] can be used to securely
sum the input values of multiple parties (p ≥ 3), such that
no party learns the individual values of other parties, but
only the summed value. The input can either be a single
numeric value or a vector of numeric values. For example, p
numeric values (v1, v2, · · · , vp) can be securely summed by
using a random numeric value r′ which is sent by a LU .
The first party P1 that receives r
′ calculates the summation
of r′ + v1 and sends to P2. This process is repeated until
the last party sends r′ + v + 1 + v2 + · · · + vp to the LU
which then subtracts r′ from the summed value to calculate
the summation of p values. The protocol employs a ring-
based communication pattern over all parties which allows
the LU to learn the final values (
∑p
i=1 vi) but no party will
learn the values vi of the other parties. This basic secure
summation (BSS) protocol is susceptible to collusion risk
among the parties. In Section 4 we propose extended secure
summation protocols for improved privacy against collusion.
2.4 Counting Bloom filters (CBFs)
In this section we propose a novel method of calculat-
ing the similarity of p BFs using a CBF, which will provide
increased privacy compared to using BFs for similarity cal-
culation, as we will discuss in Section 6.2. A CBF c of p
(p > 1) BFs is an integer array data structure of the same
length as the BFs (l). It contains the counts of values in
each bit position β, 1 ≤ β ≤ l over a set of p BFs in its
corresponding position, such that c[β] =
∑p
i=1 bi[β], where
c[β] is the count value in the β bit position of the CBF c and
bi[β] ∈ [0, 1] provides the value in the bit position β of BF
bi. Given p BFs (bit vectors) bi with 1 ≤ i ≤ p, the CBF
c can be generated by applying a vector addition operation
between the bit vectors such that c =
∑
i bi.
Theorem 2.1. The Dice coefficient similarity of p BFs
can be calculated given only a CBF as:
Dice sim(b1, · · · , bp) =
p× |{β : c[β] = p, 1 ≤ β ≤ l}|
∑l
β=1 c[β]
(2)
Proof. The Dice coefficient similarity of p BFs (b1,b2,
· · · , bp) is determined by the sum of 1-bits (
∑p
i=1 xi) in the
denominator of Eq. (1) and the number of common 1-bits
(z) in all p BFs in the nominator of Eq. (1). The number
of 1-bits in a BF bi is xi = bi[1] + bi[2] + · · · + bi[l], with
1 ≤ i ≤ p. The sum of 1-bits in all p BFs is therefore∑p
i=1 xi =
∑p
i=1 bi[1] + bi[2] + · · · + bi[l]. The value in a
bit position β (1 ≤ β ≤ l) of the CBF of these p BFs is
c[β] = b1[β]+ b2[β]+ · · ·+ bp[β]. The sum of values in all bit
positions of the CBF is
∑l
β=1 c[β] =
∑l
β=1 b1[β] + b2[β] +
· · · + bp[β] which is equal to
∑p
i=1 xi =
∑p
i=1 bi[1] + bi[2] +
· · ·+ bi[l]. Further, if a bit position β (1 ≤ β ≤ l) contains 1
in all p BFs, i.e. ∀pi=1bi[β] = 1, then c[β] =
∑p
i=1 bi[β] = p.
Therefore, the common 1-bits (z) that occur in all p BFs
can be calculated by counting the number of positions β ∈ c
where c[β] = p, while the sum of number of 1-bits (
∑p
i=1 xi)
is calculated by summing the values in bit positions β ∈ c,∑l
β=1 c[β].
If the LU gets only the CBF c that contains the summed
values in the bit positions of p BFs instead of the actual
p BFs, then the LU can calculate the Dice coefficient of p
BFs using Eq. (2) without learning any information about
the individual bit positions of each party. As an example,
the Dice coefficient calculation of the two BFs from the two
parties P1 and P2 in Figure 2(a) is extended by using a
CBF and secure summation to calculate the similarity by
the LU , as shown in Figure 2(b). The information gained by
the LU (and/or database owners) from a single CBF is less
than p BFs (i.e. CBFs provide increased privacy compared to
BFs), as theoretically proven in Section 6.2 and empirically
validated in Section 7.
3. MULTI-PARTY PPRL ALGORITHM
Our protocol allows efficient, approximate, and private
linking of records based on their masked QID values in mul-
tiple databases from p (≥ 2) sources/parties. We first de-
scribe a basic na¨ıve protocol based on CBFs, which we name
as ‘NAI’, and in Section 5 we then propose improved commu-
nication patterns for this protocol to make it more scalable.
The steps of our protocol are listed below.
• Step 1: The parties agree upon the following pa-
rameter values: the BF length l; the k hashing func-
tions h1, . . . , hk to be used; the length (in characters)
of grams q; a minimum similarity threshold value st
(0 ≤ st ≤ 1), above which a set of records is classi-
fied as a match; a private blocking function block(·);
the blocking keys [2] B used for blocking; and a set of
QID attributes A used for the linkage.
• Step 2: Each party Pi (1 ≤ i ≤ p) individually
applies a private blocking function [43] block(·) to re-
duce the number of candidate sets of records C (from∏p
i ni, where ni = |Di| is the number of records in
Di held by party Pi), which otherwise becomes pro-
hibitive even for moderate ni and p. The block(·) func-
tion groups records according to their blocking key val-
ues (BKVs) [3] and only records with the same BKV
(i.e. records in the same block) from different parties
are then compared and classified using our protocol.
A phonetic-based blocking [2] or any of the existing
multi-party blocking techniques for PPRL [26, 27] can
be used as the block(·) function.
Algorithm 1: Secure summation of BF vectors.
Input:
- DMi : Party Pi’s records masked into BFs bi, 1 ≤ i ≤ p
- R′: List of random vectors used by party P1 or the LU
for secure summation of BFs
Output:
- C: Candidate record sets with CBFs
1: C = { } //initialize C
2: for 1 ≤ i ≤ p do:
3: if i = 1 then: //first party
4: for rec ∈ DM1 do:
5: c = R′[rec] +DM1 [rec] //summation
6: C[rec] = c
7: C.send to(P2) //send C to P2
8: else: //other parties
9: C.receive from(Pi−1) //receive from Pi−1
10: for cs ∈ C do:
11: for rec ∈ DMi do:
12: c = C[cs] +DMi [rec] //addition
13: cs = cs.append(rec)
13: C[cs] = c
14: if i 6= p then:
15: C.send to(Pi+1) //send C to Pi+1
16: else:
17: C.send to(P1 or LU) //send C to P1/LU
• Step 3: Each party Pi hash-maps the q-gram values
of QIDs A of each of its ni records in their respective
databases Di into ni BFs (one BF per record in Di)
of length l using the hash functions h1, . . . , hk. It is
crucial to set the BF related parameters in an opti-
mal way that balances all three properties of PPRL
(complexity, quality, and privacy). We further discuss
parameter setting for BFs used in our protocol in Sec-
tion 6.
• Step 4: In the next step, the parties initiate a secure
summation protocol to securely perform vector addi-
tion between their BFs in order to generate a CBF for
each set of candidate records C. This secure summa-
tion can be initiated by an external linkage unit LU
that provides a vector (of length l) of random values
or by one of the parties (as will be discussed further in
Section 5). This process is outlined in Algorithm 1.
In lines 3-6, the LU or the party that initiated the com-
munication (we assume P1) sends or uses, respectively,
a random vector R′[rec] for each record rec ∈ DM1 to
sum with the party’s BF vector bi ∈ D
M
i (i = 1) by
applying a vector addition operation. The summed
vectors R′[rec]+ bi ∈ C are then sent to party Pi+1 in
line 7. Party Pi, 2 ≤ i ≤ p receives the summed vectors
from Pi−1 (line 9) and adds its BF vector bi ∈ D
M
i to
each candidate set cs ∈ C and sends the summed vec-
tors to the next party Pi+1. This process is repeated
until the last party (i.e. Pp) adds its bp vector to each
received summed vector R′[rec] +
∑p−1
i=1 bi from party
Pp−1 and sends the final summed vector back to the
LU or P1 for each candidate set cs, as shown in lines 8-
17 in Algorithm 1.
• Step 5: Finally, either the LU or the first party, P1,
that has provided the random vectors R′, subtracts
R′[rec] from the final summed vectorR′[rec]+
∑p
i=1 bi
as received from the last party Pp for each candidate
set cs ∈ C. This is achieved by subtraction of vec-
Algorithm 2: Similarity calculation of record sets.
Input:
- R′: List of random vectors used by party P1 or the LU for
secure summation of BFs
- C: Candidate record sets with CBFs
(including random vectors) from party Pp
- st: Minimum similarity threshold to classify record sets
Output:
- M: Matching record sets
1: M = { } //initialize M
2: C.receive from(Pp) //receive CBFs
3: for cs ∈ C do:
4: c = C[cs]−R′[cs] //subtract
5: Dice sim(cs) = p×|{β:c[β]=p,1≤β≤l}|∑l
β=1
c[β]
//Eq. (2)
6: if Dice sim(cs) ≥ st then: //a match
7: M.append([cs,Dice sim(cs)])
8. for 1 ≤ i ≤ p do:
9: M.send to(Pi)
tors (i.e. c = R′[rec] +
∑p
i=1 bi −R
′[rec]), which is a
special case of vector addition, as outlined in lines 2-4
in Algorithm 2. As shown in lines 5-7, the LU or P1
then calculates the Dice coefficient similarity of each
resulting CBF c following Eq. (2) to classify the com-
pared sets of records (BFs) within a block into matches
and non-matches based on the similarity threshold st.
The final similarities of matching sets of records will
be sent to all parties Pi, with 1 ≤ i ≤ p, in lines 8-9 in
Algorithm 2.
The basic secure summation protocol (BSS) used in this
’NAI’ protocol is vulnerable to collusion risk among the par-
ties. Further, the number of candidate sets to be compared
for multi-party linkage in this na¨ıve method (NAI ) is ex-
ponential in the number of parties and their dataset sizes,
which is prohibitively large to be practically feasible (even
with the existing private blocking and filtering approaches
employed) [39]. Efficient communication patterns among
the parties therefore need to be employed in order to make
multi-party PPRL scalable and viable in real applications
that require data of very large sizes from many parties to be
integrated. In the following sections we propose extended
secure summation protocols and two efficient communica-
tion patterns that not only improve the scalability of our
multi-party PPRL protocol but also make it more secure
(with less possible collusion among the parties).
4. EXTENDED SECURE SUMMATION
The basic secure summation protocol (BSS) described in
Section 2.3 is susceptible to collusion risk by the parties
involved, where if two or more parties collude they are able
to infer the input of another party. In order to overcome this
risk (to improve privacy), we propose two extended secure
summation protocols.
• Homomorphic-based secure summation (HSS): The par-
tially homomorphic Paillier cryptosystem [24] is a reli-
able secure multi-party computation (SMC) technique
for performing secure joint computation among sev-
eral parties. In the HSS approach a pair of private
and public keys is used for encrypting and decrypt-
ing the individual BF values. Successive encryption
of the same value using the same public key generates
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Figure 3: Sequential (SEQ) communication pattern for comparison of CBFs from p = 8 parties using a LU , as described
in Section 5.1. In this example, the minimum number of parties per ring is set to rm = 2. Communication steps are
shown as circled numbers.
different encrypted values with high probability, and
decrypting the encrypted values using a private key
returns the correct original value. The public key is
known to all parties while the private key is known only
to the LU . Each party Pi receives summed vectors
containing encrypted values to which Pi adds its en-
crypted bi vector (using the public key) and sends the
encrypted summed vectors to the next party. Without
knowing the private key a party Pi cannot decrypt the
received vectors and therefore colluding with a party
to learn another party’s bj (with i 6= j) would be im-
possible.
• Salting-based (using random seed integers) secure sum-
mation (SSS): The HSS approach provides a secure so-
lution compared to the BSS approach against collusion
attacks at the cost of an excessive computation over-
head, making it not scalable to linking multiple large
databases. Therefore, we propose the SSS approach
to provide security against collusion attacks in an ef-
ficient way. Salting has been used to defend against
dictionary attacks on one-way hash functions where
an additional string is concatenated with a value to be
encrypted [32]. We adopt a similar concept in the SSS
approach where the salting key is an additional random
integer used by each party Pi individually when per-
forming the secure summation. The salting key gener-
ated and used by each party is sent only to the LU and
therefore a party Pi’s BF values cannot be identified
by means of collusion among the parties, as without
knowing the salting key of Pi its BF values cannot
be learned. Since the salting keys are random integer
values, performing secure summation of BFs with the
salting keys does not add any additional computation
and communication overhead, except the communica-
tion of salting keys from parties to the LU .
5. COMMUNICATION PATTERNS
In this section, we propose two variations of improved
communication patterns for our protocol based on CBFs for
multi-party scenarios with and without a linkage unit (LU).
The main idea of these improved communication patterns is
to exploit the facts that most candidate sets are true non-
matches (due to the class imbalance problem of record link-
age [3]), and that a true matching set must have a high
similarity between any sub-set of records in that set. Hence
for multi-party PPRL applications with many parties it is
promising to determine partial matches for a sub-set of par-
ties and consider additional parties only for these partial
matches.
The parties are first arranged into rings of size r (with
r ≤ p) based on the value for the parameter rm, the mini-
mum number of parties per ring (r ≥ rm). The value of rm
needs to be carefully chosen, as it has a trade-off between
scalability (complexity) and privacy. The higher the value
for rm is, the better the privacy of the protocol because the
resulting CBFs are more difficult to exploit with an inference
attack (by mapping the CBFs to known values in a global
database to infer their underlying unencoded values), as will
be discussed in Section 6.2. On the other hand, higher val-
ues of rm results in lower scalability to large datasets across
many parties because the number of comparisons required
per ring exponentially increases with the ring size r.
5.1 Sequential communication
In this first proposed communication pattern (SEQ), which
requires a LU , the matches found in one ring are compared
with the candidate sets in the next ring resulting in a set of
matches from both rings which will then be compared with
the candidate sets in the following ring, and so on. This
communication is carried out sequentially until the matches
from all rings are found by the LU . Figure 3 illustrates the
SEQ approach for four rings with r = 2 parties in each ring.
Algorithm 3 details the steps of the SEQ communication
pattern. First the parties are grouped in rings using the
function group(·) (line 2 in Algorithm 3). Different number
of parties (≥ rm) can be grouped into different rings. The
value for rm can be agreed upon by the parties to any value
rm ≥ 2 at the trade-off between privacy and scalability, as
will be discussed in Section 6.
To minimize the number of comparisons that are required,
the grouping of parties into rings is ideally done in an as-
cending order of the size of their datasets. In this way, the
first ring will generate a smaller number of matches, which
then have to be compared with the candidate sets in the
following rings. This reduces the computational complexity
compared to initially larger number of matches being gen-
erated by the first ring if the parties in the first ring are the
ones with the largest databases.
A loop is iterated over rings in line 3 of Algorithm 3 and
then the parties in rings are iterated in line 4. Each party
in ring retrieves its records in line 5 and a loop is iterated
over these records in line 7 to append each of them to ev-
ery candidate record set (from previous party, except for the
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Algorithm 3: Comparison of CBFs using SEQ (by LU).
Input:
- DMi : Party Pi’s records with RIDs and BFs, 1 ≤ i ≤ p
- rm: Minimum ring size, with rm ≥ 2
- st: Minimum similarity threshold to classify record sets
Output:
- M: Matching record sets
1: C = {[ ]}; M = {[ ]} //initialize C, M
2: rings = group([P1, P2, · · · , Pp], rm) //group parties
3: for ring ∈ rings do: //iterate rings
4: for i ∈ ring do: //iterate parties
5: records = DMi .values() //party Pi’s records
6: for rec set ∈ C do:
7: for rec ∈ records do:
8: rec set.append(rec) //C of the ring
9: C′ = sec sum(C, ring) //summation
10: for cs ∈ C′ do:
11: c = C′[cs]
12: Dice sim(cs) = p×|{β:c[β]=p,1≤β≤l}|∑l
β=1
c[β]
//Eq. (2)
13: if Dice sim(cs) ≥ st then: //a match
14: M.append(cs)
15: C = M
first party that appends to empty sets) stored in C (line 8).
Next, a secure summation protocol is applied in line 9 using
sec sum(·) function on the candidate sets of BFs C identi-
fied in ring in order to generate CBFs for each candidate
set. In lines 10-12, each CBF c generated is then used to
calculate the Dice similarity (Dice sim) of the candidate set
(cs) and if the Dice sim(cs) ≥ st (line 13) then cs is added
into the list of matches M identified in the ring (line 14),
which will then be used as an input (line 15) in the next
ring.
The risk of collusion between parties in order to identify
data about another party can be reduced in this approach
by using different BF encodings in different iterations. For
example, if the encoding used in ring 1 in Figure 3 is un-
known to parties in ring 2, then the collusion between the
LU and parties in ring 2 would not reveal sufficient informa-
tion to infer the actual values masked in the BFs in ring 1.
Hence, parties might wish to be grouped with certain other
parties in the same ring for better privacy protection.
5.2 Ring by ring communication
In the absence of a trusted LU , as is required by the previ-
ously described SEQ communication approach, we propose
a ring by ring communication pattern (RBR) for compar-
Algorithm 4: Comparison of CBFs using RBR (without LU).
Input:
- DMi :Party Pi’s records with RIDs and BFs, 1 ≤ i ≤ p
- rm: Minimum ring size, with rm ≥ 3
- st: Minimum similarity threshold to classify record sets
Output:
- M: Matching record sets
1: rings = group([P1, P2, · · · , Pp], rm) //group parties
2: for ring ∈ rings do: //phase 1
3: Cring = {[ ]}; Mring = {[ ]}; r = len(ring)
4: for i ∈ ring do: //iterate parties
5: records = DMi .values()
6: for rec set ∈ Cring do:
7: for rec ∈ records do:
8: rec set.append(rec) //C in the ring
9: C′ring = sec sum(Cring , ring) //summation
10: for cs ∈ C′ring do:
11: c = C′ring [cs]
12: Dice sim(cs) = r×|{β:c[β]=r,1≤β≤l}|∑l
β=1
c[β]
//Eq. (2)
13: if Dice sim(cs) ≥ st then: //a match
14: Mring.append(cs) //M in the ring
15: C = {[ ]}; M = {[ ]} //initialize
16: for ring ∈ rings do: //phase 2
17: matches = Mring .values()
18: for match set ∈ C do:
19: for match ∈ matches do:
20: match set.append(match) //C in all rings
21: C′ = sec sum(C, [P1, P2, · · · , Pp]) //summation
22: for cs ∈ C′ do:
23: c = C′[cs]
24: Dice sim(cs) = p×|{β:c[β]=p,1≤β≤l}|∑l
β=1
c[β]
//Eq. (2)
25: if Dice sim(cs) ≥ st then: //a match
26: M.append(cs) //M in all rings
ing CBFs from multiple parties without using a LU . This
method is illustrated in Figure 4 for three rings with r = 3
parties in each ring, while Algorithm 4 outlines the steps
of RBR in detail. Similar to SEQ, parties are grouped into
rings using the group(·) function (line 1 in Algorithm 4).
The value for rm in RBR should be set to rm ≥ 3, as a min-
imum of three parties are required in each ring to perform
secure summation without a LU .
The RBR method consists of two phases. In the first
phase (lines 2-14 in Algorithm 4), the parties in each ring
(lines 2-4) individually perform secure summation among
them using sec sum(·) (line 9) on their sets of candidate
records Cring (generated in lines 5-8) to generate the CBFs
C′ring , and calculate their similarities to identify matches
Mring in each ring (as shown in lines 10-14). In the second
phase in lines 16-26, all parties then perform secure sum-
mation among them on the matches identified in each ring
Mring in order to identify matches M from all p parties.
Every ring in the first phase can employ a different set
of BF parameters to reduce the possibility of collusion be-
tween a set of parties in different rings. In the second phase,
all parties then have to agree on another set of parameters
for BF encodings of the matches identified in rings in the
first phase. In addition, the rings in the first phase can be
processed independently and in parallel in a distributed en-
vironment making the RBR more scalable (than the SEQ)
with larger dataset sizes.
6. ANALYSIS OF THE PROTOCOL
In this section we analyze our multi-party PPRL protocol
in terms of complexity, privacy, and linkage quality.
6.1 Complexity analysis
We assume p parties participate in the protocol, each hav-
ing a database of n records. We assume a private block-
ing/indexing technique employed in the blocking step forms
b ≤ n blocks for each party. In Step 1 of our protocol,
the agreement of parameters has a constant communication
complexity. Blocking the databases in Step 2 has O(n) com-
putation complexity at each party, and finding the intersec-
tion of blocks from all parties has a communication complex-
ity of O(p ·b) and a computation complexity of O(b · log b) at
each party, as p ·b BKVs need to be securely communicated,
and for each of the b BKVs a search operation of O(log b) is
required in order to identify the intersection set. Assuming
the average number of q-grams in the QID attributes A of
each record is g, the masking of QID values of records into
BFs of length l using k hash functions for n records in Step 3
is O(n · g · k) at each party.
Steps 4 and 5 consist of the secure summation of BF vec-
tors to calculate the CBFs of candidate sets. Our extended
secure summation protocols HSS and SSS aim to improve
privacy at the cost of complexity overhead. The extended
HSS protocol requires n · l ·p encrypted values (long integers
of 4 bytes each) to be exchanged among the parties, while
the basic secure summation (BSS) and SSS require exchang-
ing n · l · p short integer values (of 2 bytes each), which is
more efficient compared to HSS. Further, the homomorphic
encryption and decryption functions used in HSS are com-
putationally expensive compared to simple vector addition
and subtraction operations [19].
With the simplified assumption that all blocks are of equal
size n/b, i.e. contain n/b BFs at each party, then using the
NAI communication method in each block (n/b)p candidate
sets of BFs (i.e. all candidate sets of records in a block) have
to be generated and their CBFs calculated. The first party
performs b(n/b) summations, the second party b(n/b)2, and
finally b(n/b)p summations are performed by the last party,
leading to a total of O(
∑p
i=1 b(n/b)
i) summations in Step 4.
In Step 5, either the linkage unit LU or the first party that
initiated the secure summation protocol performs a vector
subtraction operation (subtracts the random vectors from
the summed vectors) on all the candidate sets, resulting in
b(n/b)p CBFs. The similarities of these CBFs are then cal-
culated and matches classified, which requires O(b(n/b)p)
computations. This combinatorial complexity currently lim-
its the NAI linkage to a small number of parties or a large
number of small blocks (i.e. p or n/b has to be small).
The communication patterns SEQ and RBR proposed in
Sections 5.1 and 5.2, respectively, improve Steps 4 and 5 sig-
nificantly (depending on the number of parties per ring, r)
by reducing the computation and communication complexi-
ties. In general the complexities are reduced from the expo-
nential growth with p down to r+1 in SEQ and max(r, p/r)
in RBR. With the simplified assumption that each ring has
r parties, the computation and communication complexities
of the SEQ and RBR methods are as follows.
In the SEQ method, b(n/b)r candidate sets are processed
in the first ring and b(n/b)r+1 in each of the remaining
rings (i.e. b(n/b) matching sets, in the worst case, from the
previous ring are compared with the b(n/b)r sets in each
ring), resulting in total computation and communication
complexities of O(
∑r
i=1 b(n/b)
i + (
∑r+1
i=1 b(n/b)
i · (p/r− 1))
(with r < p). The computation and communication com-
plexities of the RBR method is O(
∑r
i=1 b(n/b)
i · (p/r) +
∑p/r
i=1 b(n/b)
i), where the first phase requires b(n/b)r total
candidate sets to be processed in each of the p/r rings and
the second phase compares the b(n/b) matching sets from
each ring.
Overall, the complexity of the NAI method is O(b(n/b)p),
the SEQ method is O(b(n/b)r+1 ·p/r), and the RBR method
is O(max(b(n/b)r · p/r, b(n/b)p/r). This theoretical analysis
shows that the two proposed communication methods SEQ
and RBR are computationally efficient compared to the NAI
method. Depending on the values for p and r, the SEQ and
RBR methods outperform each other.
The memory size required for a CBF is 2x, which is 2x ≥ p,
bits for every position in the CBF. If the length of CBF
is l, the total memory consumption is l × ⌈log2(p)⌉. For
p BFs the memory required is 1 bit for every position in
the BF, and therefore the total memory consumption of
1 × l × p. CBF requires relatively more memory than us-
ing BFs when p is small, however with increasing num-
ber of p in multi-party PPRL, a CBF requires significantly
lower memory compared to BFs. For example, when p = 5
and l = 1, 000 the respective memory sizes of a CBF and
corresponding BFs are 1000 × ⌈log2(5)⌉ = 3000 bits and
1×1000×5 = 5000 bits, while for p = 10 and l = 1, 000 they
are 1000×⌈log2(10)⌉ = 4000 bits and 1×1000×10 = 10000
bits, respectively.
6.2 Privacy analysis
As with most of the existing PPRL approaches, we as-
sume that all parties follow the honest-but-curious (semi-
honest) adversary model [43], where the parties follow the
protocol while being curious to learn the other parties’ data
by means of inference attacks on input data [41] or collu-
sion [43]. To analyze the privacy against inference attacks,
we discuss what the parties can learn through inference at-
tacks or collusion during the protocol. We assume a trusted
LU is available, which does not collude with any parties, as
is commonly used in many practical PPRL applications [29].
However, collusion among the database owners is a pri-
vacy risk in the basic secure summation protocol where a
set of parties can collude to learn the BF of another party
using their received summation values. To overcome this
problem, in Section 4 we have proposed two extended se-
cure summation protocols, HSS and SSS. The HSS protocol
uses homomorphic encryptions for secure summation which
makes the protocol more secure because without knowing
the private key (which is only known to the LU) identifying
a party’s BF values by means of collusion will not be success-
ful. However, this protocol encrypts each integer value in a
BF (in total l values for each BF) into a hash key (long inte-
gers) and thus incurs a very large communication overhead
making the protocol not viable for linkage of multiple large
databases. The SSS protocol similarly makes the protocol
more secure by adding additional integer values as salting
keys by each party individually (known only to the LU) in
the secure summation, such that without knowing the salt-
ing key value collusion among parties to learn a party’s BF is
not possible. Compared to HSS, the SSS approach does not
incur any expensive communication overhead as the salting
keys are small integer values.
Communication occurs among the parties in Step 1 of our
protocol (as described in Section 3) where they agree on
parameter settings, and in Steps 4 and 5 where they par-
ticipate in a secure summation protocol. The agreement of
parameter settings in Step 1 does not reveal any sensitive
information about the underlying data. Secure summation
involves partial (masked) data exchange where the parties
communicate the partial and full summations of their BFs
(1) among them in Step 4 and (2) to the LU or the first
party that initiated the communication in Step 5, respec-
tively, to calculate the CBFs of the candidate sets and their
similarities.
The LU (in SEQ or NAI ) or the first party in each ring
(in RBR) receives the CBFs of candidate sets in each ring.
Compared to calculating similarities of sets using their BFs
directly, using a CBF makes the inference attack on individ-
ual BFs and thus their q-grams (strings) mapped into them
more difficult. An inference attack allows an adversary to
map a list of known values from a global dataset (e.g. q-
grams or attribute values from a public telephone directory)
to the encoded values (BFs or CBF) using background infor-
mation (such as frequency) [41, 16]. The only information
that can be learned from such an inference attack using a
CBF c of a set of x BFs (summed over x parties, where ei-
ther x = p in NAI and RBR methods or x = r in SEQ and
RBR methods) is if a bit position in c is either 0 or x which
means it is set to 0 or 1, respectively, in the BFs from all x
parties.
Proposition 6.1. The probability of identifying the orig-
inal (unencoded) values of x (x > 1) individual records Ri
(with 1 ≤ i ≤ x) given a single CBF c is smaller than the
probability of identifying the original (unencoded values) of
Ri given x individual BFs bi, 1 ≤ i ≤ x.
∀xi=1Pr(Ri|c) < Pr(Ri|bi)
(3)
Proof. Assume the number of original (unencoded) val-
ues that can be mapped to a masked BF pattern bi from an
inference attack is ng. ng = 1 in the worst case, where a
one-to-one mapping exists between the masked BF bi and
the original unencoded value of Ri. The probability of iden-
tifying the original value given a BF in the worst case sce-
nario is therefore Pr(Ri|bi) = 1/ng = 1.0. However, a CBF
represents x BFs and thus at least (in the worst case) x
original (unencoded) values, which leads to a maximum of
Pr(Ri|c) = 1/x with x > 1 (when x = 1, c ≡ b1). Hence,
∀xi=1Pr(Ri|c) < Pr(Ri|bi).
We will empirically evaluate and compare the amount of
privacy provided by masking records into CBFs and BFs
against an inference attack in Section 7.5. A larger number
of parties in a ring r (i.e. the larger the value for x) results in
an increase in the difficulty of an inference attack (a smaller
probability of suspicion 1/x) by the adversary (LU or the
first party in each ring for SEQ and RBR, respectively) at
the cost of more candidate set comparisons.
Further, using different hash encodings h1, · · · , hk by dif-
ferent rings in our SEQ and RBR methods improves privacy
compared to the NAI method by reducing the possibilities
of collusions, as discussed in Section 5. Since the hash func-
tions used by parties in ring 1, for example, are not known
to parties in other rings, a collusion between parties in other
rings and / or the LU will not be successful in inferring the
original values of parties in ring 1. A careful grouping of
parties is therefore required to improve privacy in a multi-
party setting (for example, LU randomly groups or changes
the grouping for different blocks). More specifically, when
p parties are involved in the linkage, the maximum num-
ber of possible combinations for collusion in NAI method is
∑p
i=1(p−1), while in SEQ and RBR it is
∑p/r
i=1
∑r
j=1(r−1).
For example, with p = 9 parties the NAI method has 72
possibilities to collude while grouping into equal sized rings
(r = 3) leads to only 18 different collusion possibilities.
The values for the number of hash functions used (k) and
the length of the BF (l) provide a trade-off between the link-
age quality and privacy [34]. The higher the value for k/l,
the higher the privacy and the lower the quality of linkage,
because the number of q-grams mapped to a single bit (and
therefore the number of resulting collisions) increases, which
leads to lower linkage quality but makes it more difficult for
an adversary to learn the possible q-gram combinations [16].
The CLK encoding method (as discussed in Section 2.1) of
hash-mapping several QID values from each record into one
compound BF [34, 38] makes it even more difficult for an
adversary to learn individual QID values that correspond to
a revealed bit pattern in a BF.
6.3 Linkage quality analysis
Our protocol supports approximate matching of QID val-
ues, in that data errors and variations are taken into ac-
count depending on the minimum similarity threshold st
used. The quality of BF-based masking depends on the BF
parameterization [34, 37]. For a given BF length, l, and
the number of elements g (e.g. q-grams) to be inserted into
the BF, the optimal number of hash functions, k, that mini-
mizes the false positive rate f (of a collision of two different
q-grams being mapped to the same bit position), is calcu-
lated as [21] k = l/g ln(2), leading to a false positive rate of
f = (1/2ln(2))l/g.
While k and l determine the computational aspects of BF
masking, linkage quality and privacy will be determined by
the false positive rate f . A higher value for f will mean a
larger number of false matches and thus lower linkage qual-
ity [21, 34]. In our experimental evaluation we will set the
BF parameters for our approach according to the discussion
presented here and following earlier BF work in PPRL [9,
34, 38, 37].
7. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we empirically evaluate the performance of
our protocol (which we refer as AM-CBF for Approximate
Matching with Counting BFs) with the SEQ, RBR, and NAI
communication patterns in terms of the three properties of
PPRL, scalability (complexity), linkage quality, and privacy.
We describe the competing baseline methods in Section 7.1,
the datasets used in Section 7.2, the evaluation measures
in Section 7.3, and the experimental settings in Section 7.4.
We then discuss the experimental results in Section 7.5.
7.1 Baseline methods
We use Lai et al. [17]’s exact matching BF-based PPRL
approach (referred as EM-BF for Exact Matching with BFs)
and Vatsalan and Christen [39, 40]’s approximate match-
ing BF-based PPRL approach (AM-BF for Approximate
Matching with BFs) as competing baseline methods to com-
pare with our proposed approach. Since other existing ap-
proaches for multi-party PPRL (as reviewed in Section 8)
are either based on expensive cryptographic techniques or
applicable to categorical data only, we do not compare them
with our approach.
Lai et al.’s EM-BF approach [17] performs exact match-
ing of QIDs across multiple parties using BFs. In their ap-
proach, the QID values of all records in a dataset are first
converted into one BF. Each party then partitions its BF
into segments according to the number of parties involved in
the linkage, and sends these segments to the corresponding
other parties. The segments received by a party are com-
bined using a conjunction (logical AND) operation. The
resulting conjuncted BF segments are then exchanged be-
tween the parties to construct the full conjuncted BF. Each
party checks its own full BF of each record with the con-
juncted BF, and if the membership test is successful then
the record is considered to be a match. Though the cost
of this approach is low since the computation is completely
distributed between the parties and the processing of BFs is
fast, the approach can only perform exact matching.
Vatsalan and Christen proposed AM-BF [39, 40] by adapt-
ing the idea used in EM-BF of distributively computing the
conjunction of a set of BFs from multiple parties to per-
form privacy-preserving approximate matching for multi-
party PPRL. Once the conjuncted BF segments are com-
puted by the respective parties, a secure summation protocol
is initiated among the parties to securely sum the number
of common 1-bits in the conjuncted BF segments as well as
the total number of 1-bits in each party’s BF. These two
sums are then used to calculate the Dice coefficient similar-
ity of the set of BFs. A filtering approach is employed to
reduce the number of comparisons based on segment simi-
larity, such that if a sub-set of BF segments of a candidate
set (as calculated by a respective party) has lower similarity
then the BFs do not have to be compared with any of the
BFs from the other parties.
Both EM-BF and AM-BF approaches use theNAI method
for comparing and classifying candidate sets of records.
7.2 Datasets
To provide a realistic evaluation of our approach, we based
all our experiments on a large real-world database, the North
Carolina Voter Registration (NCVR) database as available
from ftp://alt.ncsbe.gov/data/. This database has been
used for the evaluation of various other PPRL approaches [9,
26, 27, 39, 40, 41]. We have downloaded this database
every second month since October 2011 and built a com-
bined temporal dataset that contains over 8 million records
of voters’ names and addresses [4]. We are not aware of
any available real-world dataset that contains records from
more than two parties that would allow us to evaluate multi-
party PPRL approaches. We therefore generated, based on
the real NCVR database, a series of sub-sets for multiple
parties, as will be described next.
To allow the evaluation of our approach with different
number of parties, with different dataset sizes, and with
data of different quality, we used and modified a recently
proposed data corruptor [5, 36] to generate various datasets
with different characteristics based on randomly selected
records from the NCVR database. The identifiers of the
selected and modified records were kept the same, which
allows us to identify true and false matches and therefore
evaluate linkage quality, as described below. Specifically,
we extracted sub-sets of 5, 000, 10, 000, 50, 000, 100, 000,
500, 000, and 1, 000, 000 records from the NCVR to gener-
ate datasets for 3, 5, 7, and 10 parties, where the number of
matching records is set to 50% (i.e. half of selected records
occur in the datasets of all parties).
To evaluate how the approaches work with ‘dirty’ data,
we created several series of datasets for each of the datasets
generated above, where we included a varying number of cor-
rupted records into the sets of overlapping records (0%, 20%,
and 40%). We applied various corruption functions on ran-
domly selected attribute values, including character edit op-
erations (insertions, deletions, substitutions, and transposi-
tions), and optical character recognition and phonetic mod-
ifications based on look-up tables and corruption rules [5].
This means that a certain percentage of records in the over-
lap were modified for randomly selected parties, while the
original values were kept for the other parties. Therefore,
some of these records are exact duplicates across some par-
ties in a set, but are only approximately matching duplicates
across the other parties in the set. This simulates, for exam-
ple, the situation where three out of five hospitals have the
correct and complete contact details (like name and address)
of a certain patient, while in the fourth and fifth hospitals
some of the details of the same patient are different.
7.3 Evaluation measures
We evaluate the three properties of PPRL using the fol-
lowing evaluation measures. The complexity (scalability) of
linkage is measured by runtime, communication size, and the
number of comparisons required for the linkage. The qual-
ity of the achieved linkage is measured using the F-measure,
calculated on classified matches and non-matches, that has
widely been used in record linkage, information retrieval and
data mining [2].
In line with other work in PPRL [26, 39, 40, 41], we eval-
uate privacy using disclosure risk (DR) measures based on
the probability of suspicion, i.e. the likelihood a masked (en-
coded) database record in DM can be matched with one
or several (masked) record(s) in a publicly available global
database G. The probability of suspicion for a masked
value/record RM , Pr(RM), is calculated as 1/ng where ng
is the number of possible matches in GM to the masked
value RM . We conducted a frequency linkage attack [41] by
mapping the exchanged bit information in the BFs gener-
ated from DM to the BFs generated from GM . We used the
worst case scenario where G ≡ D, because when G ≡ D
there will be a one-to-one exact matching of a global value
for each value in D. Based on such linkage attack, we calcu-
late the following disclosure risk measures, as proposed by
Vatsalan et al. [41].
Runtime (sec) Size (MBytes) F-measure
BSS 34.03 47.11 1.0
HSS 60557.93 1257.06 1.0
SSS 34.03 47.15 1.0
Table 1: Results of secure summation protocols (p =
3, n = 5000).
• Mean disclosure risk (DRMean): This calculates the
average risk (
∑|DM |
i Pr(R
M
i )/|D
M |) of any sensitive
value in DM being re-identified.
• Marketer disclosure risk (DRMark): This is calculated
as the proportion of masked records in DM that match
to exactly one masked record in GM (|{RM ∈ DM :
Pr(RM) = 1.0}|/|DM |).
7.4 Experimental settings
We implemented both our proposed approach and the
competing baseline approaches in Python 2.7.3, and ran all
experiments on a server with four 6-core 64-bit Intel Xeon
2.4 GHz CPUs, 128 GBytes of memory and running Ubuntu
14.04. The programs and test datasets are available from the
authors.
Following the discussion in Section 6.3 and other work
in PPRL [9, 33, 38], we set the parameters as BF length
l = 500, the number of hash functions k = 20, the length of
grams q = 2, the minimum similarity threshold st = 0.8, and
the number of parties p = [3, 5, 7, 10]. For the SEQ method
the minimum number of parties per ring was set to rm = 2
and for the RBR method rm = 3. The attributes first name,
last name, city, and zipcode were used as the QIDs in the
linkage. We applied a Soundex-based phonetic blocking [2]
for the private blocking step in all approaches, which results
in a set of blocks on which we individually conduct private
comparison and classification.
The experiments are two-fold. In the first part we evaluate
the scalability of our approach with proposed communica-
tion patterns and compare with the NAI method. In the
second part we compare the complexity, linkage quality, and
privacy of our approach (with the SEQ approach as it gave
the best results in the first part) with baseline methods. We
used the first name and last name attributes as the blocking
keys in the second set of experiments and all four attributes
in the first set of scalability experiments in order to allow for
comparative evaluation with the NAI method (as we were
unable to run experiments for the NAI method on larger
datasets with larger p when only two blocking attributes
were used).
7.5 Discussion
Table 1 shows the runtime and memory size required and
the F-measure results achieved with the three secure sum-
mation protocols. As can be seen, the HSS requires signif-
icantly higher runtime and memory (which is not practical
in real applications) to improve privacy against collusion
attacks on the BSS without compromising the F-measure
results. However, the SSS approach requires similar run-
time and memory as the BSS for improving privacy against
collusions with no loss in linkage quality. We therefore use
SSS in all following experiments.
Figures 5 (a) and (b) show the complexity of our AM-
CBF approach with the proposed communication patterns
SEQ and RBR in terms of runtime and communication size
(comm), while Figure 5 (c) shows the runtime and commu-
nication size required by the NAI communication pattern.
As the figures show the proposed communication methods
improve the scalability of our multi-party approach by signif-
icantly reducing the number of candidate sets (and thereby
the complexities) compared to the NAI method (which has
been used in many existing solutions including the baseline
approaches). As discussed in Section 6.1, SEQ is faster than
RBR (Figure 5 (a)). When p = 5, RBR is equivalent to NAI
(as we set rm = 3). Both SEQ and RBR are scalable (al-
most linear) with the dataset size and the number of parties
compared to the NAI method that increases exponentially
with the number of datasets and their sizes. We were unable
to conduct linkage experiments using the NAI method for
larger p and dataset sizes due to its exponential complexity
(and thus some data points for the NAI method are missing
in Figure 5 (c)).
Figure 5 (d) shows the number of candidate sets to be
compared and classified using our AM-CBF approach. The
number of candidate sets with the NAI method grows ex-
ponentially with the size of the datasets for increasing p,
as can be seen when p = 10. In Figures 5 (e) and (f), we
compare the complexity requirements of the SEQ and RBR
methods with different ring sizes based on rm on the NCVR-
10,000 datasets for p = 10 parties. We evaluated the SEQ
method with rm = [2, 3, 4, 5] and the RBR method with
rm = [3, 4, 5] (rm ≥ 3 in RBR). This provides ring sizes of
[2,2,2,2,2], [3,3,4], [4,6], and [5,5] for rm = 2, 3, 4, and 5, re-
spectively. As shown in the figures, the complexity increases
with larger ring sizes, because larger ring sizes mean more
comparisons are required in each ring.
We compare the runtime required by our approach (with
SEQ) with the baseline approaches on the NCVR-10,000
and 50,000 datasets in Figure 6 (a). Though the baseline
approaches require lower runtime for linking p ≤ 5 datasets
than our approach (because the matches identified in one
ring need to be compared again with the candidate sets in
the other rings in our approach), they are not scalable to
more parties (p > 5) and larger datasets. We were unable
to conduct experiments for AM-BF with p > 7 and EM-BF
with p > 5 on the NCVR-50,000 datasets due to the expo-
nential increase in the number of candidate sets generated.
As can be seen in Figure 6 (a), our approach is scalable and
requires significantly lower runtime for linking p = 7 and 10
datasets compared to the baseline approaches.
As shown in Figure 6 (b), our approach outperforms the
baseline EM-BF and AM-BF approaches in terms of linkage
quality measured by F-measure. The filtering approach used
in AM-BF results in lower F-measure compared to our ap-
proach. The F-measure is high on the non-modified datasets
(0% corruption), while it drops with p on the modified (20%
and 40%) datasets as the number of missed true matches in-
creases when records are modified in each dataset. However,
our AM-CBF approach achieves the highest F-measure on
both modified and non-modified datasets (though EM-BF
performs equally well on the non-modified datasets).
Finally, we compared the DR measures of privacy for our
approach based on CBF masking with baseline approaches
based on BF masking in Figures 6 (c) and (d). The results
show that the DR measures with our approach are consis-
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Figure 5: (a) Total runtime and (b) communication size required for the SEQ and RBR and (c) NAI methods, (d)
the number of candidate sets to be compared for the linkage on different dataset sizes; and complexity requirements
of (e) SEQ and (f) RBR for different ring sizes on the NCVR-10,000 datasets for p = 10 parties. Note both axis of (a)
- (d) and the y-axis of (e) and (f) are in log scale.
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Figure 6: Comparison of (a) runtime on the NCVR-10,000 and NCVR-50,000 datasets (missing data points are
discussed in Section 7.5), (b) F-measure of linkage, and (c) privacy results measured by mean disclosure risk (DRMean)
and marketer disclosure risk (DRMark) on the NCVR-10,000 datasets with competing baseline approaches.
tently lower (and thus privacy is higher) than the baseline
approaches. As expected, the DR measures also decrease
with larger p (as discussed in Section 6.2), and with more
corruptions in the dataset because corrupted records reduce
the probability of mapping to matching global values in G
to allow the records to be re-identified.
8. RELATED WORK
Various techniques have been proposed in the literature
tackling the problem of PPRL [43]. However, most of them
consider linking two databases only, and a only few ap-
proaches have been proposed for PPRL on multiple databases.
An SMC-based approach using an oblivious transfer pro-
tocol was proposed by O’Keefe et al. [23] for PPRL on mul-
tiple databases. While provably secure, the approach only
performs exact matching of masked values (i.e. variations
and errors in the QIDs are not considered) and it is computa-
tionally expensive compared to efficient perturbation-based
privacy techniques, such as BFs and k-anonymity [43]. A
multi-party k-anonymity-based PPRL approach was intro-
duced by Kantarcioglu et al. [12]. In their apporach, a secure
equi-join (exact matching) is applied on the k-anonymized
databases by a LU to identify matching records.
A multi-party PPRL approach for approximate matching
of categorical values was proposed by Mohammed et al. [22],
where a top-down generalization is performed to provide
k-anonymous privacy and the generalized blocks are then
classified into matches and non-matches using the C4.5 de-
cision tree classifier. Another efficient multi-party approach
for categorical data was recently proposed by Karapiperis et
al. [14] using a Count-Min sketch data structure. Sketches
are used to summarize the local set of elements which are
then intersected to provide a global synopsis using homo-
morphic operations, secure summation, and symmetric noise
addition privacy techniques.
As described in Section 7.1, Lai et al. [17]’s approach uses
efficient Bloom filter encoding for masking string data in
multi-party PPRL. However, the approach performs only ex-
act matching. This approach has been adapted by Vatsalan
and Christen [39, 40] for approximate matching in multi-
party PPRL (as described in detail in Section 7.1). Several
approximate comparison functions for calculating similari-
ties of pairs of string and other data types have been pro-
posed for PPRL by adapting existing comparison functions.
A secure version of the Levenshtein edit distance was pro-
posed by Karakasidis and Verykios [13] using CBFs, where
the elements of a string are checked against a CBF of an-
other string to count the number of edits, while the CBF
also provides the length of the string masked into it. How-
ever, developing privacy-preserving comparison functions for
multiple (more than two) values has only recently been con-
sidered by Vatsalan and Christen [39, 40] using the Dice
coefficient similarity.
Scalability has been addressed by using private blocking
functions and / or filtering approaches [43, 44] as well as by
parallelizing and / or distributing the tasks among several
nodes or parties [15, 44]. The scalability problem in multi-
party PPRL has only recently been focused on. Ranbaduge
et al. [27, 28] proposed a family of efficient tree-based private
blocking techniques for multi-party PPRL using BF encod-
ing and secure summation. Several filtering approaches have
been used in PPRL of two sources, including length filtering
in BFs [38] and PPJoin techniques [35]. The recently pro-
posed multi-party BF-based PPRL approach [39, 40] (de-
scribed above) employs a filtering approach based on the
similarity of segments of BFs. However, the number of com-
parisons required for multi-party linkage remains very large
even with existing private blocking and filtering approaches
employed [27, 39]. Therefore, efficient multi-party filtering
and communication patterns need to be developed in order
to make PPRL scalable and viable in practical applications.
Several query tree representations have been used for op-
timizing multi-way join queries [20, 31]. Schneider and De-
Witt [31] studied query processing plans with different types
of structures, left-deep, right-deep, and bushy. Left-deep
and right-deep trees use a base table as the inner and outer
operand, respectively, of each join in the plan, while in bushy
trees both inputs to a join may themselves result from joins.
However, these techniques have not been used for efficient
processing of multi-party PPRL.
9. CONCLUSION
We have presented an efficient and scalable protocol for
PPRL of multiple databases with two improved communica-
tion patterns. Our approach performs approximate match-
ing on the QID values (of string data) masked using effi-
cient and simple privacy techniques, counting BFs and se-
cure summation. Experiments conducted on real datasets
showed the efficiency and scalability of our approach com-
pared to two baseline approaches while achieving superior
results in terms of linkage quality and privacy.
In future work, we plan to investigate other improved
communication patterns, collision resistant secure summa-
tion protocols, and different approximate string comparison
functions [2] to be incorporated. We also aim to develop effi-
cient PPRL techniques for identifying matching record sets
within sub-sets of parties, which is an important research
problem.
Another research direction would be to develop multi-
party PPRL approaches under other adversary models such
as the covert model [1] or accountable computing [11] (where
honest parties can verify fake data from dishonest parties
with high probability) to overcome the limitations of the
semi-honest (HBC) adversary model. Finally, we plan to in-
vestigate improved classification techniques for multi-party
PPRL including relational clustering and graph-based ap-
proaches [2] which are successfully used in non-PPRL appli-
cations.
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